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Abstract

This thesis examines the motives for the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, which established a
separation between commercial and investment banking in America for most of the twentieth century.
The most common understanding in popular and legal sources is that the act was designed to help
avoid the misuse of commercial funds that had led banks to fail in the 1930s. Earlier analyses found
that the bill was not actually passed as a result of research that demonstrated the effectiveness of the
provisions. In this thesis, it is argued that the bill was not formulated as a response to careful economic
analysis of why banks had actually failed. Rather, the proponents of the bill had predetermined ideas
about how banks should function and which activities should be allowed—namely, that commercial
banks should be occupied with funding the business of the nation and not engage in trading securities.
This conclusion is supported by examination of the establishment of the Federal Reserve
System, which involved many of the same sponsors of the passage of the Glass-Steagall act. One of the
primary objectives of the Federal Reserve, according to its sponsors, was to limit speculative activities
by banks. When this objective was not realized, they looked for new ways to limit how banks operated.
Thus, Glass-Steagall was enacted, with the hope that it would reduce speculation and cause banks to
operate more closely with actual production. While the act did ultimately succeed in reducing the
involvement of banks in securities, it does not appear to have been effective at making bank loans more
closely related to economic production, which was its stated goal.
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Preface
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 defined American banking for much of the twentieth century.
Popularly established as a vital component of prudent banking, it was accepted as an important
economic safeguard by observers and regulators of the banking system. In the last decades of the
twentieth century, however, the efficacy of the act was challenged by new research. This led,
ultimately, to the repeal of the act in 1999. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a movement
began to revive the act and reinstitute its provisions.
The act’s thirteenth section established one of the defining features of American banking for
sixty five years: a separation between commercial and investment banking. This was part of a series of
efforts to make banking more secure, and at the time it was passed there was little questioning of the
rationale behind the act. It simply made sense to enact changes that would protect depositors from a
recurrence of the bank failures of the 1930s.
Predictably, banks felt restricted by the provisions set in place by Glass-Steagall. Over the next
few decades, they looked for exceptions to work around the regulations. On two occasions, methods
used by banks were reviewed by the Supreme Court, both times resulting in rulings against the banks.
Eventually, Congress agreed that the regulations were stifling the banks and not allowing them to
compete with non-American financial institutions. On November 12, 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act was passed, repealing Glass-Steagall. Banks were now free to engage in activities that had been
forbidden to them for over six decades.
It is rare for a regulation to come to a complete end; it is even rarer to soon have calls for its
revival. Within a few years, people began to question whether it had been wise to repeal Glass-Steagall.
From 2007 to 2009, the United States experienced another financial crisis. Many financial institutions
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that had acquired subprime mortgage assets had failed or been acquired by the end of 2007. 1
Throughout 2008 there was much concern that the failures could not be contained. The crisis finally
subsided but only after claiming some of the most prestigious American financial firms and the largest
bank failure in US history. There were no formal studies showing any relation between transactions that
were enabled by Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the factors that led to the financial crisis, yet some
observers, mostly in journalistic venues, claimed that it had played an important role. According to one
report, “economic experts say that Gramm and others are to blame for the current crisis that is shaking
Wall Street. Gramm’s successful effort to pass banking reform laws in 1999, which reduced decadesold regulations separating banking, insurance and brokerage activities, helped to create the current
economic crisis.” 2 The official report on the crisis, released in January 2011 by the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, dedicates several pages to the events leading to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, including
the details of how much was spent on lobbying for the repeal.3
The assertion of a connection between the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the recent financial crisis
begins with an understanding, expressed by journalist Daniel Gross on the website Slate.com, of GlassSteagall as “one of the many necessary measures taken by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the
Democratic Congress to deal with the Great Depression.” These measures were necessary because, as
Gross put it, “in the 1920s commercial banks…recklessly plunged into the bull market, making margin
loans, underwriting new issues and investment pools, and trading stocks. When the bubble popped in
1929, exposure to Wall Street helped drag down the commercial banks.” This had a deep effect on the
economy, and “the results were devastating….The policy response was to erect a wall between
investment banking and commercial banking.” 4 It is this understanding of Glass-Steagall that allows a
connection to be made between the act’s repeal and the subsequent financial crisis.
1
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The trouble with this popular narrative of Glass-Steagall is that in the bank records and hearings
leading to the act it is not so clear why the act was passed. In fact, as it will be discussed below, several
decades after the Glass Steagall Act there was substantial disagreement among supporters of the act
about why it had been passed. It may seem logical that reckless activities by banks had devastating
effects on the economy and that there should be limits to what banks could do, but not everyone
understood that as the problem that Glass-Steagall had been enacted to solve.
Several studies in the 1980s and 1990s analyzed the specific conditions of banks before GlassSteagall. They found that the bank failures had actually not been caused by banks’ reckless activities in
the 1920s. From several perspectives, it was shown that there was no obvious link between activities
relating to securities and bank failures. Collectively, these studies raised the question of what was, in
fact, meant to be accomplished with Glass-Steagall.
There is also some doubt about why the bill’s sponsors and supporters thought it necessary. The
hearings about bank performance took place in 1931, yet there was no great rush to have the bill
passed. There was a banking bill passed in 1932 addressing other banking issues, primarily measures
that made it easier for banks to receive funds from the Federal Reserve. In 1933, when Glass-Steagall
was introduced, Congress could not find a way to pass it until other events brought more attention to
bank regulation. If the activities that the bill addressed were widely understood to have had devastating
results on the economy, a much greater sense of urgency in passing the bill would be expected.
Subsequently, the sponsor of the bill proposed the removal of some of its restrictions. It would hardly
be wise to reintroduce the bank activities that had caused so much devastation. Thus, it would appear
that the bill was not generally seen as being so necessary, and perhaps there were other reasons behind
its passage.
In the regulation of banks throughout the 1910s and 1920s, there are certain recurring themes.
From 1913 when the Federal Reserve System was established, some regulators and politicians were
fixated on a nebulous set of activities that they referred to collectively as “speculation.” These were
3

activities often related to the stock market, but also to corporate bonds and other types of securities.
They objected to the fact that banks were connected to these activities. The opposition to the activities,
which seemed to have risen in part from moral considerations, had begun before there was any problem
or even reason to think that there would be a problem.
The early history of the Federal Reserve, from 1913 to 1929, has particular relevance. The
sponsors of the 1913 bill establishing the Federal Reserve believed that it would reduce speculation by
the banks. They continued to be concerned with speculation throughout the next two decades, and there
were several attempts to make changes, through the Federal Reserve, that would reduce what they
considered speculation. When banks began failing, it was inevitable that those same sponsors would
look for ways to hold banks back from speculation and securities.
The way to stop banks from being involved with securities “speculation” was to forbid them
from holding those kinds of assets, which is exactly what Glass-Steagall did. In other words, there was
no need for evidence that the activities had caused devastation to convince the sponsors that it was a
wise measure to enact. The belief that these activities were “evils” made it the most obvious aspect to
target for regulation. That is why it has proved so difficult to find empirical support for the arguments
supporting the bill.
It is possible that the act was not warranted by the conditions prior to its passage, but that it still
had a stabilizing effect on the banking system. Legislation often has effects that were not foreseen or
intended, sometimes varying from the goals of those laws. At the end of this paper an attempt will be
made to see what the impact was on bank operations. The actual impact is difficult to ascertain from the
figures available, since the data were not documented with specific attention to the effect of the act, but
perhaps some conclusions can be made based on what is known.
I leave open for future study the issue of what impact the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 had
on later financial developments. It is possible that the effect was negligible. As several studies
suggested, dealing with securities in the 1920s did not make banks more susceptible to failure.
4

Similarly, that may have been the case after Glass-Steagall was repealed. On the other hand, it is also
possible that permission to engage in a whole host of new activities led banks to recklessly take on new
kinds of risk and speculation. It would be necessary to evaluate how banks dealt with the newly
permitted areas and how that compared to institutions that had always been permitted to deal with
securities of various types. Hopefully, this study will help develop an understanding about the nature of
the act and what kind of results could be expected after its repeal that could be used to similarly
analyze the repeal of the act in 1999. However, the actual outcome is beyond the scope of this study.

5

1. Understanding Glass-Steagall
Historical Interpretations of the Act and its Rationale
In 1933, banks were in trouble, and it was recognized that something must be done about it.
Beginning in 1929 there were several waves of bank failures. The problem grew to the extent that when
President Franklin Roosevelt came into office, he declared a bank holiday on March 6, 1933 during
which no banks would open, so that banks could evaluate their assets and attempt to avoid failures.
However, that did not stop the banks from failing. In fact, the bank holiday may have exacerbated the
problem, as more than 2,000 banks did not reopen after the holiday. 5 The Banking Act of 1933 was
passed in response to the banking crisis and made some important changes to the structure and
operations of American banks. The act established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
to reassure depositors. The act also changed some of the terms by which the Federal Reserve could
advance money to banks, making it easier for banks in need to acquire money.
The provision in the act which was perhaps the most controversial became known as the GlassSteagall Act, named for the sponsors of the act, Senator Carter Glass and Representative Henry B.
Steagall. It stipulated that banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System could not deal in
investment securities or hold them for their own account. They were not to underwrite the issuing of
securities and could purchase them only on behalf of clients. There were also new restrictions on
relationships between banks and securities dealers. The act drew a sharp line between the activities of
commercial banks in accepting deposits and making loans and activities related to stocks and other
securities actions.
The purpose of the bill was to stop the commercial banks from engaging in activities that had
not traditionally been considered part of banking. Why that was a desirable goal was not so clear. There
are actually several interpretations of the act, but the historical basis for them is tenuous or
insubstantial.
5

Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 330.
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The most widespread consensus, originally suggested by the act’s sponsors, seems to have been
that the banks’ activities had somehow led to the stock market crash in 1929, which in turn caused a
mass failure of banks and brought on the Great Depression. With such drastic results, it could be
readily understood that those activities seen as outside the traditional realm of banks should be stopped.
According to this understanding, bank failures had convinced Congress to ban the activities that were
seen as having led to the failures.
This enduring view was later expressed by the Supreme Court in a 1971 case Investment
Company Institute v. B. Camp 6 in which the Court ruled that Glass-Steagall did not allow for accounts
that combined investments with deposits. In its explanation for the act’s passage, the Court said that “it
is apparent from the legislative history of the Act why Congress felt that this drastic step was
necessary.” That was because “Congress was concerned that commercial banks in general and member
banks of the Federal Reserve System in particular had both aggravated and been damaged by stock
market decline partly because of their direct and indirect involvement in the trading and ownership of
speculative securities.” The most sensible way to react to this was to prevent involvement in similar
trading. Although Congress understood that there could be positive aspects to banks trading securities,
"the Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination that policies of competition, convenience, or expertise
which might otherwise support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business
were outweighed by the ‘hazards’ and ‘financial dangers’ that arise when commercial banks engage in
the activities proscribed by the Act.” 7 In the Court’s telling, the “drastic step was necessary” since
securities-related activities had led to “financial dangers.” Banks had both caused damage and been
damaged due to their investments in securities. Congress was determined to stop these unnecessary
dangers from happening.
The Court’s understanding of the act is perhaps most clearly expressed in a 1981 decision,

6
7

401 US 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091 (1971).
Ibid., 1098.
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, which also sought
to define what was included in the act. 8 Citing Senator Glass’ statement, the Court explained that “it is
familiar history that the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in 1933 to protect bank depositors from any
repetition of the widespread bank closings that occurred during the Great Depression.” This familiar
story was known to Congress, which “was persuaded that speculative activities, partially attributable to
the connection between commercial banking and investment banking, had contributed to the rash of
bank failures.” In fact, the ruling continues, there is strong evidence for this connection, and “the
legislative history reveals that securities firms affiliated with banks had engaged in perilous
underwriting operations, stock speculation, and maintaining a market for the bank’s own stock, often
with the bank’s resources.” Although the earlier decision had failed to mention any evidence, the Court
now believed that due to this evidence, “Congress sought to separate national banks, as completely as
possible, from affiliates engaged in such activities.” 9 Here the Court asserts that the banks’ involvement
in investment operations had specifically led to the extensive amount of bank failures that took place in
the early 1930s. The point of the act was to protect depositors from losing their deposits again in this
manner.
In contrast to the Court’s understanding, another view held that the act was implemented not to
protect bank depositors, but rather to protect the buyers of securities and address the problems in the
securities market. An article prepared for a congressional testimony by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker in 1986 reported that “Congressional hearings on the securities practices of banks disclosed
that bank affiliates had underwritten and sold unsound and speculative securities, published
deliberately misleading prospectuses, manipulated the price of particular securities, misappropriated
corporate opportunities to bank officers, engaged in insider lending practices and unsound transactions
with affiliates.” Not only were banks promoting risky securities, there were also under pressure to
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450 US 46, 101 S.Ct. 973 (1981).
Ibid., 984.
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continue supporting those assets. This in turn caused “confusion by the public as to whether they were
dealing with a bank or its securities affiliate” and led to the “loss of confidence in the banking system.”
This explains more specifically why banks were more harmful when they sold securities. Banks were
different than all other institutions involved in securities, since they were more easily able to defraud
the public. Also, banks were invested in companies and had an incentive to make unwise loans to them.
The banks were, thus, “deliberately misleading” the investors, who thought they were getting sound
investments. 10
Differing from these explanations, another approach focused on banks’ relationships to their
clients and how they could have exploited the trust of the clients. Bank officials were respected by the
public for their knowledge on financial matters, and, it was argued, they would convince people who
did not know better to buy risky securities that the banks needed to sell. A 1970 brief to the Supreme
Court filed in the case of Investment Company Institute v. B. Camp described “three well defined evils”
that “were found to flow from the combination of investment and commercial banking.” The included
the two aforementioned reasons and added that “a commercial bank’s financial interest in the
ownership, price, or distribution of securities inevitably tempted bank officials to press their banking
customers into investing in securities which the bank itself was under pressure to sell because of its
own pecuniary stake in the transaction.” 11 The brief combines all three reasons: the banks were risking
depositors’ money; they were also making unsound loans; and they were “inevitably tempted” to push
unknowing investors into unwise deals.
Apart from the agreeing that the banks’ securities operations had led to complications, there
does not appear to have been much agreement about which conditions led to the act. The Supreme
Court felt that investment activities had led to widespread bank failures. Others believed that banks
10
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Benston, Separation of Commercial, 12.
11
Brief for Respondent First National City Bank, 1970 WL 121913 (U.S.) National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
v. S.E.C., 1970.
9

were pushed to support bad investments. And others asserted that banks were pressing regular citizens
into bad investments. These were all believed to have been behind the decision to ban commercial
banks from dealing with securities. It appears that scholars looking back at the act could not find a clear
reason for its establishment. There may have been many problems with banks prior to the act, but, as
will be discussed later, these were not the reasons given at the time of the act’s passage.

Evidence for Explanations
Later researchers, including economists Eugune N. White, 12 George J. Benston, 13 and Randall
S. Kroszner and Raghuram Rajan, 14 looking for evidence, that was believed to have been established
before the act was passed and would demonstrate problems caused by banks dealing in securities, were
unable to verify the alleged problems. They did find that there were many abuses by the banks, and
many banks clearly did fail. But it had not been so certainly established that banks’ involvement in
securities had led to the abuses or the failures. It was also not evident that investments made by
commercial banks were any more risky than investments made by other institutions.
The Congressional hearings in 1931 that led to the act investigated many aspects of the banks’
operations. Congress was interested in finding all instances when banks had caused unnecessary losses.
Yet the hearings did not conclude that investments had caused, even indirectly, those losses. The
hearings confirmed that “the wholesale underwriting of securities does tend at times to leave the
security affiliates with big unsold commitments that, in times of rapidly declining prices, may result in
large losses of at least a temporary nature.” 15 All that was actually stated is that the commitments may
result in losses. There was no evidence that deposits in banks suffered from those potential losses, nor

12

White, “Before the Glass-Steagall Act.”
Benston, Separation of Commercial.
14
Kroszner and Rajan, “Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified?”
15
Hearings 1931, 1057-58.
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is there any evidence that banks misled their clients. An example was given at the hearings of losses in
Bethlehem Steel Corporation common stock. The stock went from a high of $139.50 in August 1929 to
a low of $7.25 in June 1932. 16 This was just one example of the extent of losses from investments that
went bad. However, the fact that a company could be exposed to losses like Bethlehem Steel is quite
logical. Every investment takes on a certain amount of risk, but that does not mean that it was actually
a factor in causing bank problems; 17 for that, the hearings offered no evidence.
From all the bank officers who gave testimony at the hearings, there was little connection drawn
to actual failures of banks. In Investment Company Institute v. B. Camp, the Supreme Court decision
cited a specific example of the failure of a bank with investments, the Bank of United States, which
was, in fact, the only failed bank that the hearings cited to demonstrate the trouble of holding securities.
The Bank of United States, which failed in December 1930, was seen as having failed due to
speculative investments with depositors’ money. According to the hearings “the failure of the Bank of
United States. . .served to center attention upon the fact that banks may make large loans to affiliated
corporations which. . .became so unwieldy as to have led to the collapse of the institution.” 18 However,
a 1985 study of the assets of the bank and its affiliates by economist Joseph Lucia showed that the main
holdings were not securities, but real estate. 19 The bank made too many real estate acquisitions at the
height of the boom and overpaid for them. 20 The principal officers also tried to manipulate the bank’s
own stock and assets for their personal gain and to avoid bank examiners. But this was not related to
securities activities and would not have been prevented by the Glass-Steagall regulations. 21
There is no doubt that some banks in the 1920s engaged in abuses and fraud. The hearings
produced many instances of investments that went bad and resulted in losses, but there was little

16
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evidence that those losses were what caused banks to fail. Economist Eugene N. White tested the claim
that securities affiliates were dependent on and thus endangered the banks. In a 1986 study, he found
that banks did not become more susceptible to losses when they acquired securities; rather they
“increased their liquidity when their affiliates’ borrowing rose faster than cash assets.” 22 White also
performed a study comparing the proportion of banks that dealt in securities to other banks. Based on
the allegations made at the Glass hearings about bank activities, it would be expected that banks with
securities, which were usually held by wholly owned affiliates dealing specifically with securities,
would have had a much higher rate of failure. In fact, White found, that “while 26.3% of all national
banks failed in this period, only 6.5% of the 62 banks which had affiliates in 1929 and 7.6% of the 145
banks which conducted large operations through their bond departments closed their doors.” 23 White
concludes that those banks were actually safer, probably because they were larger and more diversified.
Likewise, the allegations that securities operations produced conflicts of interest have been
difficult to substantiate. The Pecora Hearings in 1933, which will be discussed later, revealed many
instances of abuse and misconduct by bankers. However, there is little reason to believe that those
abuses were caused or exacerbated by the banks’ involvement in securities. In 1990 George J. Benston,
an economic historian, conducted an exhaustive review of the various claims against the banks and
found that “the record does not support the belief that the pre-Glass-Steagall period was one of abuses
and conflicts of interest on the part of banks involved with securities transactions.” 24
A 1994 study by economists Randall S. Kroszner and Raghuram G. Rajan compared the quality
of investments made by commercial banks and their affiliates to those made by investment banks,
which did not have depositors and were not accused of abusing relationships to make fraudulent
investments. Their analysis found that securities issued by investment banks from 1921 to 1929 were
more likely to default than those made by commercial banks. Whereas 39% of the former defaulted,
22
23
24

Ibid., 48.
White “Before the Glass-Steagall Act,” 40.
Benston, Separation of Commercial, 107. In chapter 4 Benston details his arguments.
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only 28% of the latter did so. 25 This is contrary to what would be expected had the securities operations
of commercial banks been the cause of failures, as implied by the Glass-Steagall Act. Kroszner and
Rajan used several other methods of analysis and determined that “not only did bank affiliates
underwrite higher-quality issues, but also we find that the affiliate-underwritten issues performed better
than comparable issues underwritten by independent investment banks.” 26
It would be remiss to exclusively rely on the studies which question the logic behind the GlassSteagall Act and ignore the well-researched studies which rely on conclusions of the 1931 committee
which investigated bank operations. They include detailed examinations of the bank abuses and
failures, in addition to the Pecora Hearings, which revealed many abuses in the banking industry. 27
Nevertheless, while one could insist that the alleged problems may have indeed occurred, the evidence
is far from conclusive that bank investment activities led to major failures or economic difficulties.
Bank failures and economic trouble in 1933 seem to have persuaded Congress and the public at the
time that bank investments were at fault, but the records do not back up those assertions.
Due to the difficulty in substantiating the reasons given for the Glass-Steagall Act, scholars,
such as Benston, have looked for other possibilities. There have been various alternative (or revisionist)
explanations for the act. In 1932, Senator Robert Bulkley of Ohio, a member of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, described securities activities as antithetical to foundations of banking, “the
idea of increased profits. . .diverted from the pride of safe and honest banking service to that of profits,
greed, expansion, power, and domination.” 28 Benston suggests that this may have been an underlying
reason for the act, since others may have shared Bulkley’s view that investment is alien to real banking.
However if that was truly the reasoning behind the Glass-Steagall Act, it is difficult to understand how
Glass, the main sponsor and proponent of the bill, would propose to remove the ban on securities

25
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Kroszner and Rajan, “Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified?” 817.
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activities just two years later. 29 Although it was probably an attempt to stimulate the inert underwriting
market 30 and would have been only a partial repeal, it does not seem to have been perceived as contrary
to the fundamentals of banking. Thus, concerns about diverging from authentic banking do not appear
to have been an important motivation behind the act.

29

30

See New York Times Feb 4, 1935 and July 6, 1935. Roosevelt rejected the idea, and it was removed from discussion. See
New York Times August 13 and 17, 1935.
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2. Federal Reserve as Defense Against Speculation

The Federal Reserve and Bank Speculation
Besides approaches that looked at problems with banks in the 1920s, various other explanations
have been proposed for the act. However, as it will be argued in the pages that follow, the proponents of
the act felt it apparent that its provisions were necessary years before it was actually suggested. Long
before there was a crisis or even reason to fear a crisis, the activities of the banks were already causing
much concern. However, rather than a specific type of activity causing concern, it was the fact that
banks were seen as involved in speculation, which could potentially include a wide range of activities
including any type of buying and selling of stocks and real estate. It will be suggested that rather than
the events of the Great Depression and bank abuses, it was these enduring perceptions that led to the
passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. The activities of the 1920s did not inevitably cause the failures of the
banks. The failures provided an opportunity to implement changes to bank operations that had been
conceived many years earlier.
In general, scholars distinguish between investment and speculation. The financial analysts
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, in their 1934 book Security Analysis, defined investment as
operations based on analysis of the safety and return of the investment. Everything else was considered
speculation. 31 Another approach, which is perhaps just an elucidation of Graham’s and Dodd’s, defines
speculation as a purchase with the intention to resell at a later date with the expectation that the price
will rise in the meantime. 32 Nevertheless, as Graham acknowledged in a later book The Intelligent
Investor, published in 1949, all investments have an element of speculation in them. 33
An assertion that banks or other institutions were engaged in speculation must attempt to define which
activities are considered undesirable speculation. This was, however, not performed. It remained a
31
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vague assertion that banks were engaged in speculation without defining it.
The concern with speculation on the stock market did not begin with the bank failures at the end
of the 1920s. Whenever there was a problem with banks in previous decades, there would inevitably be
people blaming the problems on speculation by the banks. The first major reform of the American
banking system of the twentieth century was in 1913 with the passage of the Federal Reserve Act.
Although it is not commonly recognized by most narratives of the central bank’s establishment, the
Federal Reserve Act was to a large extent a reaction to perceived speculation and an attempt to
constrain the speculation. The methods and regulations of the Federal Reserve System served to aid this
goal of containing speculation. It is thus a helpful place to begin looking at the concerns about
speculation that eventually brought about the Glass-Steagall Act.
The Glass-Steagall Act, sponsored and advocated by Senator Glass, incorporated his principal
concerns with the banking system and was the culmination of his long career in managing the nation’s
banks and finances. Those same concerns were evident in all his years of involvement with the
financial system. His first bill, and the most influential, was passed in 1913 and initially called simply
the “Glass Bill,” but later became known for the important institution that it spawned, the Federal
Reserve. Glass’ main conceptions of how banking should operate were included in some form in the
Federal Reserve Act, although perhaps not in a very effective manner.
The obvious purpose of the Federal Reserve was to correct the problems that were inherent to
the American banking system and led to continual bank failures. With an effective system in place,
there should not have been an opportunity for major crises to hit the banks. Therefore, the shocks to the
banking system in the early 1930s must inevitably be seen in relation to the Federal Reserve. The
failure of the banks was in effect a failure of the Federal Reserve, either in its specific actions or in its
general composition. Since the Great Depression, there has been debate about the role of the Federal
Reserve in countering the economic crisis. There are some critics, principally the economists Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their 1963 book, A Monetary History of the United States, who blamed
16

the failures of the banks on the inactions of the Federal Reserve. 34 Others defended the Federal Reserve
and placed the blame on the banks. The problem, they believed, was not in the actions or inactions of
the Federal Reserve but in its structure. They argued that the Federal Reserve should have been given
the power to prevent the problems from occurring and agree that had the Federal Reserve been
organized differently the crisis might have been prevented. 35 Nevertheless, by what it did not or could
not do, the Federal Reserve evidently had a major role in the later bank operations and failures.
The purpose and scope of the Federal Reserve cannot be separated from a discussion of the
bank failures of the 1930s. The regulations enacted as a result of the failures may be best understood by
examining the establishment of the Federal Reserve itself. And the discussion at the time of the passage
of the Federal Reserve Act is significant for the impact it had on later issues, eventually leading to the
Glass-Steagall Act. Moreover, it will be argued that the reasons given for the Glass-Steagall Act were
the same reasons given for establishing the Federal Reserve. The failures of many banks in the early
1930s seemed to undermine the Federal Reserve System. The passage of the Glass-Steagall act can,
therefore, be seen as means of protecting the Federal Reserve from actions that were regarded as
subverting the objective of the reserve bank.
The second half of the nineteenth century was a turbulent period for American finance, as the
United States went through several bank panics. Throughout this period many observers believed that
the problem lay in individual offenses and poor judgment rather than in the system. The panic of 1873
began with banks that had made unwise investments in railroad companies, which had expanded
prematurely into an undeveloped West and then failed. 36 Similarly, the panic of 1884 could be traced to
a steep drop in utilities stocks and the banks that put money in them as well as other speculative
ventures. 37 (This episode prompted the London magazine The Spectator to call Americans “a nation of
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the most degenerate gamesters in the world.” 38 ) And the panic of 1893 was triggered by the collapse of
industrial stocks, which led to the failures of many banks. 39
Although it was possible to blame each event on its own excess speculation, some began to
wonder whether the problem with American banks was, in fact, a systemic one. While there had clearly
been unwise speculation in many firms, speculation did not necessarily have to lead to bank failures. At
each episode, a general panic would ensue among the public, who were worried that all of a bank’s
funds would be lost. Deprived of their deposits, the banks would fail. But if some way could be devised
to make it easier to supply banks with money when their funds were low, the waves of failures could
perhaps be avoided. Several plans were put forward focusing on those solutions to provide banks with
more funds during times of emergency, including the 1894 Baltimore Plan and, with many variations,
the 1897 Indianapolis Plan. These plans were controversial at the time and were never implemented.
However, the fact that there were well-publicized plans to change the banking system is evidence that it
had become widely acknowledged that there was a problem with the system, rather than just with
speculation of individual investors. 40
In 1907 there was another major banking panic, which was severe enough to remove any doubt
about the need for reforming the banking system. An attempt to manipulate the price of a mining
company, based on a mistaken stock market calculation, set off a panic. Several related banks were
brought down. 41 There was no apparent way out of the crisis as banks continued to close until the
efforts of a group of bankers led by J.P. Morgan slowed the runs on banks. They contributed to a pool
that could be accessed by other banks in distress. 42 At the time, a bank in need had no means of
obtaining immediate funds. These bankers provided what the banking system did not.
Although the actual panic lasted just a few weeks and did not prove to be among the worst such
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panics, its impact was felt across the nation. Banks were forced to withhold cash payments and give
certificates instead, which people then used to barter for goods. In some cases other items were used
instead of cash. Streetcar companies in Omaha and St. Louis paid their employees in nickels from the
fare boxes or in fare-tickets. The panic had caused depositors to withdraw their money and hoard it. It
is estimated that over $200 million was stashed away, and the demand for deposit boxes spiked. 43 With
events like these, the troubles in the banking system could no longer be ignored.
Congress understood that it was necessary to come up with a plan that would be able to provide
money at times when the funds of a bank were low. 44 The Aldrich-Vreeland Act, a temporary act
passed in May 1908, allowed the banks to issue more money. The act stipulated that, in times of
emergency, banks would be allowed to issue more money based on the assets they were holding. In
effect, they could simply expand the money supply when necessary. 45
The act gave a couple of options for obtaining money. Banks were allowed to issue up to 75%
of the amount of securities and other non-public assets and up to 90% of public assets; previously they
been able to count as assets only deposits. If they felt the money was necessary, they could apply to
National Currency Associations that would be established by groups of banks. The associations, in
various cities, would determine how much money the banks could issue. These options were, albeit in a
different form, the basis of the future reserve banks.
The Aldrich-Vreeland act was invoked on one occasion. In July 1914, when World War I began
in Europe, many depositors became anxious about the security of their money. The emergency
measures of the act were put into effect, and the runs on banks subsided. 46 The act was successful in
preventing a larger crisis.
However, the act was intended only as a temporary device in case of emergency. Rather than
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correcting the system as a whole, it had merely provided some emergency provisions. Congress,
though, was intent on making major changes to the banking system and how banks operated; in 1908, it
used a provision of the act to establish a committee to study the banking system and how it could be
improved. Led by Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island the committee would be composed of nine
senators and nine representatives. Although it would take a few years until the sweeping changes were
implemented, the main innovations, which were the establishment of a central banking association and
the ability to issue currency backed by any assets, were already embedded in the Aldrich-Vreeland
act. 47
The Aldrich committee took to its task seriously and began to study alternatives to the American
banking system. They traveled abroad to interview central bankers, then published reports on their
findings. 48 For several years they were unable to come up with a plan for the American system. Finally,
in 1911, under pressure to produce something, they proposed the Aldrich Bill. It was the first bill
introduced in Congress for reforming the banking system.
The most distinctive aspect of the bill was its regional reserve branches. The Aldrich Bill
proposed a group of banks in different cities to be called the National Reserve Association. The banks
were to take deposits only from their member banks. There would be no deposits from the government
or the public. 49 While the government would appoint some of the members of the board, the majority
was to be chosen by the banks. This emphasis on private control of the bank generated much opposition
and was part of the reason that the bill failed. 50 However, the main features of the bill were not ignored
and were incorporated in later proposals.
In fact, most of what the committee suggested had already been proposed by others in the
private sector several years before. Most prominent among them was Paul M. Warburg, a German
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banker who in 1902 had joined a prestigious New York banking firm. His ideas became well known by
1910, as he published several essays and spoke at a number of venues on the subject. Many aspects of
his plan were eventually used in the American reserve banks. 51
According to Warburg’s plan, a bank would be located in Washington, with branches in twenty
other cities. It would be established by interested banks and have a large deposit of money that could be
accessed by its members. Only the member banks and the federal government would be able to deposit
in this bank. It would be called the United Reserve Bank, and its directors would be known as
governors. 52 Importantly, this bank would be the sole issuer of currency in the United States. This was
a major change from the existing system, which allowed any national bank 53 to issue currency. The
similarity to the reserve plans is easily apparent. Many elements were used in the Aldrich committee
plan and were eventually incorporated into the Federal Reserve Act. The committee and the scholars
who had researched the banking system had identified, and seemed to agree on, which reforms would
be necessary.

Speculation as Cause of Failures

The main contours of what would become the Federal Reserve System were, thus, known and
accepted by 1911. Nevertheless, when the reserve system was finally established, it was seen by its
sponsor as something very different from any of the suggestions that had come earlier. This may be
because it represented other goals and a different understanding of the problems in the system. A
different perception of the trouble with the American banking system could, therefore, lead to a
different understanding of what a reserve bank should accomplish. Thus, Glass may have been justified
in believing that the reserve system that was realized, although it shared the main characteristics of the
earlier plans, had a different goal and was really a different kind of system.
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There appeared to be an agreement, among most observers, that the problem lay in the structure
of the American banking system. Each bank was on its own when it needed to raise funds. Much of the
focus was therefore on structuring banks in such a way that they would have access to funds when it
was necessary. The success of Morgan and the other bankers at supplying emergency funds and
restoring order was a clear indicator that the banking system needed its own method of similarly
supplying funds to banks. But there was another approach to the problem that posited the blame not on
the system, but on the bankers. If the bankers had not made reckless investments, it was argued, the
banks would not have needed the emergency funds.
In the aftermath of the 1907 panic, banks found themselves blamed for the crisis. President
Theodore Roosevelt called for federal regulations on speculation and margin trading. And New York’s
Governor Hughes appointed a committee in 1908 to investigate how speculation could be prevented.
However, the committee was stopped by a problem shared by everyone who analyzed speculation.
They found that it was easier to decry speculation than to identify it and that it would be difficult to ban
speculation without also affecting necessary activities. They complained about "the practical
impossibility of distinguishing what is virtually gambling from legitimate speculation." 54 These
attempts to change how banks operated were not successful and were soon forgotten.
However the tendency to criticize the banks persisted. Along with Wall Street, the efforts at
reforming the banking system were also criticized. The various plans that had been proposed for a
reserve bank were denounced for giving the banks more opportunities to speculate rather than reining
them in. Woodrow Wilson took up the issue and made the opposition to Wall Street part of his 1912
presidential campaign. 55 There was clearly popular opposition to how banks operated.
This opposition soon led to criticism of other areas of the financial sector. It was believed that
bankers simply had too much power. The fact that bankers had come together in 1907 and saved other
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banks was seen as part of the problem. It was an indication of the great power that was in the hands of a
small group of people. In fact, a senator accused the bankers of having "brought on the late panic, to
serve their own ends." In this suspicious environment, fears were raised that a group of people
controlled the entire system and were perhaps running a “money trust,” through which they would
manipulate businesses so that they would profit while denying opportunities to others. 56 A committee
was established in late 1913 to investigate the actions of Wall Street.57
The chairman of the committee was Congressman Arsene Pujo, of Louisiana, who had until
then been a member of the Aldrich committee that was looking for banking solutions. In early 1913
after Wilson’s election and the Democrats’ taking control of both houses, he left to head the committee
that would investigate what bankers did. Its specific goal was to ascertain whether a “money trust”
existed in which a group of people held an inordinate amount of power over the economy. It also
addressed some of the larger questions about the nation’s financial and monetary conditions. 58 It was
both a sign and a catalyst of a deep distrust in the nation’s banks.
At the hearings, the leading investment bankers were called upon to testify and excuse their
actions. The committee eventually reached the conclusion that there was in fact a group of people,
based in the large Northeastern cities, who were manipulating the economy to their benefit. They
declared that “the powerful grip of these gentlemen is upon the throttle that controls the wheels of
credit and upon their signal those wheels will turn or stop.” 59 As it was later presented by Justice Louis
Brandeis, 60 there was an inner group that had control, not only over financial institutions but also over
the nation’s largest transportation and industrial companies. 61 Banks were apparently always finding
ways to reap profits from other people’s work and money.
The hearings went beyond general economic activity and also touched on investment
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operations. The committee voiced its disapproval of banks’ investments and asserted that “it is
unquestionable that only a small part of the transactions upon the exchange is of an investment
character; a substantial part may be characterized as virtually gambling…In its nature it is in the same
class with gambling upon the race track or at the roulette table.” 62 Various cases of alleged stock
manipulation were analyzed. 63 In a recurring theme, buying and selling securities were seen as being
identical to gambling in its methods, results, and social desirability. The conclusion was that large
portions of investments were pure speculation and had caused many of the bank crises.
The committee’s recommendations touched on many issues. One is of particular relevance. It
was recommended that Congress prohibit national banks from buying, selling, or lending stocks, so that
banks would not use their “facilities for gambling.” 64 Moreover, banks should not be allowed to have
ties with securities affiliates because “the temptation would be great at times to use the bank’s funds to
finance the speculative operations of the holding company. . .whether under the guise of a mere lender
of money or underwriter or purchaser of securities.” 65 In fact, the first section of the bill introduced in
Congress was about banning banks from securities operations. 66 This points to a widespread suspicion
of stock market activity, especially when performed by a familiar institution such as a bank.
None of the Pujo committee’s twenty or so recommendations were enacted. 67 The findings of
the committee were apparently not very convincing. Nevertheless it had an impact in other ways. Even
if the existence of a money trust was not so apparent, there was a widespread feeling that bankers were
not operating in a manner that was best for the nation. It seemed that a public institution could do a
better job than the private bankers had done. This supported the idea that a central bank should
supervise the activities of private banks to ensure that they did not engage in harmful behavior. 68
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The Glass Bill and Its Objectives
At the same time that the Pujo committee was established, another subcommittee of the House
Banking and Currency committee was set up, chaired by Congressman Carter Glass, of Virginia. It was
tasked with examining the options for an American central bank, the same issues that the Aldrich
committee had spent several years on. Glass saw it as literally being part of the same mission as the
Pujo committee. It was simply that “Chairman Pujo divided his committee into two sections, one to go
after ‘the Money Devil’ and the other to pursue the constructive work of revising the currency
system.” 69 It is significant that the chairman of the committee that would establish an American central
bank saw his committee as part of a movement against banking overreach and abuses. This would
understandably have an effect on the kind of central bank he would try to produce.
One of the themes that Glass repeated was that his task was to create a system that was different
from Aldrich’s. He announced at the beginning of the hearings that “it is nevertheless a fact that we
must recognize and deal with that the party of the majority members has specifically declared against
what is known as the Aldrich bill.” 70 The Aldrich bill was seen as being too accommodating to bankers.
Glass later reiterated that the Democratic Party had declared conclusively against that plan, so that any
part of it must be precluded from consideration.71 Every part of the Glass bill would be scrutinized to
see whether it was similar to the Aldrich bill.
This was a difficult feat to accomplish. The Aldrich bill had, after all, been an attempt to set up
a system that would have pooled reserves and acted as lender of last resort. It would be difficult to
avoid everything associated with Aldrich and still accomplish the same goal. This is what Paul Warburg
in his testimony to the committee tried to convey somewhat humorously, saying, “do not forget that the
Aldrich plan contains some things which are simply fundamental rules of banking. Those you will have
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to include in every plan, and I think that the Democratic Party would make a great mistake, if I may say
so, to say, ‘Because Senator Aldrich ate his soup with a spoon we are not going to eat with spoons but
must use forks.’” 72 Nevertheless, Glass maintained that his plan was to be radically different from
Aldrich’s.
There was one conceptual point that Glass was most concerned about. The essence of the
Aldrich plan, according to Glass, which had been rejected by the Democrats, was its idea of a central
bank. It called for the establishment of a single bank that would manage the reserves of the nation’s
banks. There would be branches in several cities, but there would be one location that would control all
the reserves. Glass did not like the idea of a central bank taking the power to decide away from the
people. He felt that it would continue the existing problems by concentrating too much power in the
financial centers. What the American system needed was a bank that did not make decisions centrally.
His proposal was to create regional banks, which would represent the interests of their
respective regions. They would each have their own reserves and would be linked by monetary policies
directed by a central board. As it was later described “the Glass bill is modelled [sic] upon our federal
political system. It establishes a group of independent but affiliated and sympathetic sovereignties,
working on their own responsibility in local affairs, but united in national affairs by a superior body
which is conducted from the national point of view. The regional banks are the states and the Federal
Reserve Board is the Congress.” 73
The purpose of regional banks was more than just to keep the power away from a central entity.
An advantage of a regional bank was that it could have an understanding in the local conditions and set
policy accordingly. 74 Instead of making decisions based on conditions in the financial centers, each
region could proceed with policies best for itself. It would also allow for easier oversight of what the
banks were doing with the money. Since all the reserves would be handled by a regional bank, that
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reserve bank could pay close attention to how the money was dispensed. Regular investigation was
seen as an important function of the reserve banks. 75
Establishing these regional banks was apparently, for Glass, the most important aspect of the
bill. As his subcommittee expert, Glass chose Henry Parker Willis, a professor at Washington and Lee
University. Glass explained that “the selection indicated was made by the chairman only after the latter
in quite a few intimate talks was convinced that Dr. Willis entertained views akin to his own definite
idea of establishing a system of regional banks authorized to issue notes on the basis of commercial
transactions.” 76 The regional banks and their ability to regularly investigate what banks did were at the
core of Glass’ bill.
There was such interest in monitoring what banks did because there was evidently concern
about the legitimacy of some of the activities. In particular, the idea that banks were too involved in
speculation came up frequently. Some of the witnesses at the hearings explained that what had been
called speculation was really just a normal method of buying and selling. One compared the stock
activity to a whiskey merchant who might decide to order more whiskey than usual, hoping that the
customers would be interested in buying more. It could later turn out to have been an unwise decision.
But that is part of the regular operation of a business. 77 Another witness tried to clearly define the
difference between speculation and gambling. 78 Nevertheless, the committee was not convinced by
these arguments and remained determined to stop that kind of activity.
It was not clear that Glass’ new system could actually work. In fact, critics of the bill were
opposed to precisely the part that Glass was so fond of. If the purpose of establishing a “reserve” bank
was to hold the nation’s reserves and make them accessible to banks in need of funds, then that would
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be better served by having a single bank handle all the reserves. In addition, others argued, the reserve
banks in the smaller regions would be too small to raise the money necessary to support their member
banks. 79
At the same time, opponents of the bill wondered in what way it was not actually a central bank.
The main policy decisions were left in the hands of board in Washington. Some congressmen argued
that Glass gave more power to the board than Aldrich had. “This plan is much more centralized,
autocratic, and tyrannical than the Aldrich plan. It is true that we are to have 12 regional banks….The
power is not with them; they are not in any material matter given the right of independent action; they
must obey orders from Washington.” 80 There was no general agreement that the regional system was
the best way to set up reserve banks.
Nevertheless, the bill was pushed through generally in agreement with Glass’s ideas. It stated
that there would be between eight and twelve banks in different cities. All national banks were required
to remit their reserves to one of the banks. It also specified how many members would be in the Federal
Reserve Board in Washington and what its powers were. Guidelines were given as to what was
considered proper bank assets. And the regional banks were given power to deal on the market. The bill
was signed into law in December 1913, with the name “Federal Reserve Act.” With some minor
exceptions, Congress established a reserve system that adhered to the main objectives that Glass
believed would save the banking systems from its previous problems.
It is, however, difficult to deny that the bill was very similar to the Aldrich Bill and incorporated
elements from the other plans that had been published in the preceding years. In fact, even the idea of
regional banks had been proposed by a scholar in the private sector, Victor Morawetz, a New York
corporate lawyer who was also trained in economics, in 1909. 81 Notwithstanding the similarities, Glass
felt that his bill was utterly distinct from anything that had been proposed earlier and insisted that “the
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Federal Reserve Act has no relationship to the Aldrich plan beyond a common use in some cases of
indispensable banking technique and nomenclature.” 82 Furthermore, Willis, the subcommittee expert,
claimed that “[i]t was not derived from, or modeled after, or influenced even in the most remote way by
other bills or proposals currently put forward from private sources, but, on the contrary, it was itself the
pattern from which a host of imitators sought to copy.” 83 It would be simple to dismiss this all as Glass’
attempt to portray his own work as creative and original. However, there is one aspect of the act that is
fundamentally different from the suggestions that preceded it, even if the practical implications may
not have been very consequential. The motives for establishing the reserve banks and, thus, the goals
set for them were conceived of differently by Glass: rather than being a method to make bank
operations safer, he saw the reserve banks as a means to change how commercial banks operated.
The basic reason for having reserve banks was to have a lender of last resort. The Aldrich plan
and the other suggestions were a response to the lack of a central facility to hold reserves, and the goal
was to set up a system that would allow banks in need to access funds. The Glass plan on the other
hand was concerned with another aspect of banks. One of its underlying themes was the tendency of
banks to engage in activities that, instead of promoting business, were a source of risk and failure. It
concerned itself not only with what facilities banks were missing but also with what banks were doing
wrong. Therefore, it sought not only to provide banks with funds when necessary, but also to deprive
them of excess funds when not needed for business operations.
In 1927 Carter Glass published An Adventure in Constructive Finance, which was his attempt to
correct various conceptions about the Federal Reserve and its establishment that he felt were mistaken.
His description of the purpose of the Federal Reserve is particularly relevant to this discussion and
provides a look into the reasoning behind the Federal Reserve. He describes a banking system that
“handicapped” the United States for fifty years. One of the main problems, or “Siamese twins of
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disorder,” was that there was no official reserve system. Banks in rural areas would often have an
influx of deposits during quiet farming seasons. These banks did not want the deposits lying around
and serving no purpose, so they would send them to the large banks in the cities, which would pay
interest and use the funds for their own investments. According to Glass, “the consequence was that the
sum total of the idle bank funds of the nation was congested at the money centres [sic] for purely
speculative purposes.” The purpose of the Federal Reserve Act was to “revolutionize” the “wretched
system” 84 by setting up reserve banks where the rural banks could place their excess funds.
In addition to providing a reserve bank, the Federal Reserve Act also kept the money away from
the larger banks that, Glass, asserted, had been a “breeder of panics.” 85 When the city banks had all
those excess funds, they would use it for loans “on call, for speculation.” Then, “with stock gambling
in full blast,” the rural banks would find that they suddenly needed funds for customers who had
become busy again. The rural banks would turn to city banks and demand their funds back. However,
the “speculative loans” had been “extended beyond all capacity to pay,” and when banks needed money
but could not obtain it, this “would create consternation.” Along with the general concern, there would
be specific consequences as “interest charges would quickly jump higher and higher,” and “panic
would seize gambler and banker alike.” This panic would have an effect on the entire economy since
“banks would cease payments; merchants would suspend activities; cars would become idle; crops
would rot in the fields and labour [sic] would be deprived of its wage.” This was the main fault in the
banking system and Glass proudly noted that “it had never been attempted before,” and the result was
that “we [the sponsors of the bill and Congress] rescued the reserve fund from this evil use.” The
almost-apocalyptic terms used by Glass suggest that he was interested in more than just supporting
banks and the economy; it was some kind of mission to control “the Siamese twins of disorder” so they
could not disrupt the business of merchants and laborers.
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The principal innovation of the reserve system was the fact that there was now a lender of last
resort. When rural or city banks found themselves short on funds, they could reach out to the reserve
bank for what they needed. This would have been the case regardless of what the banks had previously
done with excess funds; they would now be able to obtain what they needed. It is noteworthy that Glass
felt not only that banking operations had been part of the problem, but also the that the Federal Reserve
was intended to stop banks from those operations. This was done in part by taking away the reserves
from private hands as Glass explained, “we cured this financial cancer by establishing regional reserve
banks and making them, instead of private banks in the money centres [sic], custodians of the reserve
funds of the nation.” 86 With this accomplished, finally, “the country banks were made free. Business
was unshackled. Aspiration and enterprise were loosed. Never again was there to be a money panic.” In
order to be freed and unshackled, the country had to be cured of the “evils” and “cancers” that had been
brought upon it. The removal of the disease was an achievement on its own, and it would enable the
nation to flourish as it could previously not.

Federal Reserve Funds as Real Bills
The claim in 1927 that there would never again be a money panic was soon to be proved wildly
optimistic and erroneous. In the early 1930s there were several waves of bank failures. This was seen
by Glass as undermining the Federal Reserve System, which had been established to prevent another
banking panic. It would once again be blamed on speculation by the banks, and he would again look for
ways to stop it. But it must first be seen how the Federal Reserve System was understood to be a
system that would prevent speculation by the banks.
The task that Glass saw for the Federal Reserve included the two seemingly contradictory goals
of both supplying and withholding funds. It would provide reserves and funds for the banks that needed
to make loans for business. And it would also hold back funds from banks that were not using it to
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make loans. But the reserve bank could not know what the banks would do with the funds that were
supplied to them. There had to be methods which would enable the proper dispensation of funds.
Part of the solution seemed to be quite straightforward. As Glass explained, it was believed that
simply by having the extra funds in reserve at public banks, rather than at private banks which bought
and sold securities, the problem would be solved. The country banks were often in need of money, and
they would be able to obtain whatever was necessary from the reserve bank. The banks in the large
cities had too much money, and that would not be the case anymore since they would not hold the
funds of the country banks. That could be easily accomplished if all the money at the city banks came
from the surplus of country banks. However, there is no way to be certain that banks would have no
other source of funds, which they could use for speculation. So there had to be a way of ensuring that
banks had access only to legitimate funds and would not be able to speculate as before.
The primary method to ensure that money was used properly was by using the real bills theory
to regulate what banks could use as assets. The real bills theory, or doctrine, was originally developed
as a method of keeping the money supply in check, containing inflation. According to the real bills
theory, banks would be able to issue currency only when it was backed by real bills, that is, bills or
promissory notes that usually came along with evidence showing that it was backed, and would be
repaid, by sales or production of goods. This was supposed to result in having the right amount of
currency in circulation. The money supply would expand as commerce expanded, but not at a quicker
pace than the commerce itself. 87
At the end of the nineteenth century this theory was extended to include all bank assets, not just
currency notes. When banks give credit and make loans it is backed to an extent by assets the banks
possess. It was argued that bank assets should be based only on real bills. That way banks would have
assets that were as reliable as possible. All bank loans were assumed to be most stable if they were
based on real bills. The concern now was not merely to strengthen the value of currency, but also to
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ensure that banks had dependable assets. 88
This theory was incorporated to varying degrees in most of the bank reform plans. But it was
extended even further with the Federal Reserve Act. The drafters of the act saw in the real bills doctrine
a way to stop the speculation of the banks. If bank assets must be based on bills related to actual
activity in the economy, then banks were not free to issue credit and speculate at will. A Federal
Reserve bank, Willis stated, “under the terms of the Federal Reserve Act...must keep its cash invested
in very short-time paper—that is to say, it makes no long investments, and endeavors to discount and
liquidate only that paper which is of exceptional quality and responsibility, and which grows out of
commercial, agricultural, and industrial transactions.” 89 By limiting banks to using real bills for
discount at the Federal Reserve banks, those banks would not be able to make the large amounts of the
speculative loans they previously had. They would be discouraged from lending against “speculative”
bills and would mostly lend against “real” bills related to actual commerce.
However, in addition to the problems inherent in the doctrine itself, 90 basing assets on real bills
would be feasible only in a banking environment that relied primarily on those bills. Although every
bank would be expected to have many different types of assets, the Federal Reserve banks would not
accept assets other than commercial bills for rediscount. It would therefore be necessary for banks to
have a sufficient amount of their assets in these bills in order to meet the requirements of the Federal
Reserve. A large proportion of the assets was expected to be of the real bills type. As Willis explains,
even though banks would have other assets, there would be a sufficient amount of real bills, since “in
every bank which does a commercial banking business. . .there will be found a large element of paper
which is of pure commercial type. If this were not true, the bank would not be a bank in the proper
sense of the term.” 91 To be a bank, Willis says, is to have a large amount of real bills.
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This relates to a conception of banking espoused by Willis and evidently incorporated in the
Federal Reserve Act. Banking, according to Willis, is about guaranteeing the credit of individuals. A
bank enables people to promise payments to each other since a note of payment will be honored by, and
redeemed through, the bank. Facilitating such payments is the foundation of banking. Engaging in
those payments, “and proper protection of the bank’s notes and deposits issued or granted so that the
holder may get cash at sight, is commercial banking.” 92 A bank allows business deals between
individual parties to proceed by backing the credit of those individuals.
Once banking was defined in this manner, it became apparent that a banking system should
work to enhance these operations, but not anything else. Therefore, Willis concluded that “the Federal
reserve system is intended to provide just this means,” and not more than that. It would not be used for
others types of assets, which might relate to more speculative activities, since “it is not a method of
supplying capital to borrowers for investment.” The only assets that could possibly be recognized are
those that adhere to the principles of banking, which are “to enable persons who have debts to pay to
get the funds with which to meet them.” 93 The debts referred to here are clearly those of the “pure
commercial type.” So a bank would end up with two types of assets: the commercial type, which the
Federal Reserve would accept; and other assets that they have acquired but do not really relate to the
business of banking and would not be accepted. 94 Banks would not be able to unduly expand their
speculative activity, because they would not be able to use these for the required rediscounting at the
Federal Reserve. As most banking operations were assumed to be based on these types of activities,
banks would have ample assets, and they would be of the proper type.
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Changes in Bank Operations
The trouble was that banking practices were changing. The system was predicated on the notion
that the essential bank business was conducted with commercial paper. This was, however, increasingly
not how banks actually operated. As economic historian Robert C. West showed in his 1974 study on
the Federal Reserve, by 1913 businesses had decreased their use of commercial bills. 95 Although those
bills had once been the standard method of procuring payment, merchants came to dislike the
uncertainty of the promissory note. The bills came to be seen as a tool that was used to collect bad
debts, rather than as a regular function of business. 96 If banks did not use real bills anymore, then some
of the methods used for achieving the goals of the Federal Reserve were no longer relevant.
The changes in banking also related to the changes in how businesses operated. The commercial
bills had developed because retailers and other purchasers had to buy large quantities of inventory each
time. It was impractical and too expensive to have very frequent deliveries. However, the money was
not available at the time of delivery, since the merchandise would be sold over a period of several
months. So the commercial bill came about to enable the buyer to pay over a longer period, which was
often three months. By the end of the nineteenth century this had begun to change. New methods of
transportation enabled suppliers to make deliveries more frequently. They now expected to be paid
immediately for the merchandise. This contributed to the decline of the use of commercial bills. 97
There were other changes that related more directly to what banks did. In fact, the ways
businesses raised money had changed. In the nineteenth century, when companies wished to raise
money, they could either borrow from various sources or they could issue bonds. But this left them in
debt, and they found that their earnings could be compromised due to the outstanding debt. When
alternative methods presented themselves, businesses were eager to take advantage. The growth of the
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stock market that began at the end of the nineteenth century gave companies opportunities to raise
capital by issuing stock. The need for commercial bills declined as these methods spread. 98 Along with
commercial bills, the need for banks to be involved in the transactions declined.
As borrowing practices changed, banks began to lose their traditional sources of profit and
needed new sources. And they were learning how to profit in new ways. During the First World War,
the government financed the war by issuing Liberty Bonds. More than 50% were distributed to the
public by banks. In an early study on banks and securities, published in 1941, economist W. Nelson
Peach suggests that this gave the banks experience in dealing with securities. 99 At the same time, the
public had grown accustomed to buying securities. Previously, many people had been hesitant to invest
in bonds. But after the war, when they had already sampled the investments, they were more inclined to
try it again. And when they were looking for advice on investments, it was logical that they would
approach their bankers, whom they trusted with their money. 100
Banking was changing in ways that the sponsors of the Federal Reserve Act had not foreseen.
They had assumed that by limiting legitimate assets to commercial bills, they would prevent banks
from getting involved in securities. But commercial bills became a less important aspect of banking in
the years following the Federal Reserve Act. Securities, on the contrary, had become more important to
bank operations. The goal that had been set of reducing activities related to securities was clearly not
being attained.
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3. Speculation by the Public
Unease With Securities Speculation After the War
That securities-related activities had not diminished became evident after a few years, and the
Federal Reserve officers began discussing their concerns about speculation and what could be done
about it. At the end of the war in September 1918 the New York Federal Reserve asked the New York
Stock Exchange to collect reports detailing how borrowing was done in the exchange. After reviewing
these reports, the bank felt that call money was too accessible and decided to raise the margin
requirements for call money. The members of the exchange became frustrated with the restrictions and
started lobbying for them to be removed. A letter from H. G. S. Noble, president of the New York Stock
Exchange, in January 1919 claimed that “today there is nothing to indicate the probability of a
speculative movement that would absorb large amounts of money…The present restrictions have
largely killed the buying power in the market.” The restrictions were then removed and brokers
resumed dealing as earlier. 101 Judging from the complaints of brokers, the restrictions on brokers seem
to have been successful at slowing down the call market.
However, this method was not attempted again by the New York Federal Reserve. In fact, over
the next decade the bank would resist pressure to work at slowing down the call market. Benjamin
Strong, the governor of the New York reserve bank (the title was changed to “president” in 1935), later
wrote that, “had it been possible for us to have continued that type of arbitrary control, it would have
been a good thing to do it.” It appears that he felt that Federal Reserve did not have the legal authority
to impose such limits. But he probably also believed, as he later said, that it was not the jurisdiction of
the Federal Reserve to deal with the stock market. That would explain why he did not seek to be
granted the power to regulate the market. 102 That is also why he later resisted pressure to enact
measures to contain the stock market. What went on in the stock market was seen as something that
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should not concern the Federal Reserve.
Others, especially the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, disagreed and felt that the Federal
Reserve banks should work to ensure that commercial banks did not use funds for speculative purposes.
Thus, a dispute, which lasted at least a decade, emerged among the officers of the Federal Reserve on
how to achieve their goals. Strong, representing the New York bank, felt that there should not be
actions specifically for the sake of the containing the stock market. If steps were to be taken, they
should be ones which relate to all aspects of the economy. In September 1919, Strong began to argue
for higher discount rates. The problem with higher rates was that it would affect not only the stock
market, but all types of borrowing. Nevertheless, Strong felt that it was the only way to contain excess
borrowing for stock purchases. 103 But Glass, then in his position as Secretary of the Treasury, was
against the idea. He was very concerned about speculation and, along with the board, believed that
measures should be taken that would directly affect activity on the stock market. Glass wrote on
November 5, 1919, “I hope that the Federal Reserve Board will not allow the Governors of the Federal
Reserve Banks to rely wholly or too heavily, for the prevention of the abuse of the facilities of the
Federal Reserve System, upon the increase in rates now established with the approval of the Board,
myself included.” He was hoping that they would make other moves against speculation and not rely
on rate increases, as Strong suggested. The concern about stock market activity was apparently not
shared by all sides equally, with the New York bank not overly worried. But even if there was a
problem, there was a fundamental debate about what should be done to deal with it.
There were also theoretical roots to this controversy. While the debate centered on the question
of what effect the raising of rates would have on the economy, it was based on a disagreement over the
proper role of the Federal Reserve banks. Glass wanted the reserve banks to be deeply involved in the
activities of their member banks. They should know for what purpose the members were borrowing. As
he wrote, “I believe it to be of prime importance that the Federal Reserve Board should insist upon and
103

Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 225-226.
38

that the Governors of the Banks should exercise a firm discrimination in making loans to prevent abuse
of the facilities of the Federal Reserve System in support of the reckless speculation in stocks.” 104 On
the other hand, the New York Federal Reserve under Strong resisted the idea that they should have to
continuously monitor all of the member banks. They felt that their task was to ensure the general
wellbeing of the banks, rather than all the individual transactions. This disagreement over the proper
role of the Federal Reserve was behind the long controversy.
In response to the pressure from Washington to prevent banks from lending for stock purchases,
Strong argued that it would not work. If all the banks were stopped from such lending, he worried that
it would result in too much money flowing out of New York. And if limits were placed on just New
York banks, nothing would stop out of town banks from making those same loans. Many of those banks
had other ways of obtaining funds aside from the Federal Reserve System. As he wrote on November
28, 1919, it would serve only to shift the activities from smaller institutions to larger ones with
sufficient capital to manage higher rates. In addition, he argued that the Federal Reserve did not have
authority to deal with the speculators directly. 105 The controversy, however, continued as Glass
persisted in his demands that the New York bank control speculation in the New York stock market.
At this time Glass did not explain how the Federal Reserve banks would stop those loans from
taking place. But in 1927, he wrote that the idea had been “to have the Governors of the various
regional banks admonish the individual banks to curtail loans for stock and commodity speculative
purposes.” 106 This seemed to Glass to be a logical extension of the powers given to the banks to
examine their member banks. They should therefore be able to easily discern when the banks were
using money for speculative purposes. Then they could “admonish” those banks. However, it seems
difficult to imagine how this admonishment would stop the banks from activities they were accustomed
to and found profitable.
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This enforcement by admonishment may have made sense in theory. But in reality, as Strong
later argued, it was not so simple to find out what the banks were doing with the funds. And there was
no guarantee that the banks would decide to obey the admonishment. It would later become clear that
banks could continue to engage in activities although they knew the Federal Reserve disapproved.
Thus, aside from the arguments Strong raised against the pressure from Washington, he seems to have
worried that he would not be able to successfully implement measures that would control banks’
activities.

The Rise of the Public Stock Market
Stock market activity and the public’s relationship to the stock market changed in the 1920s. It
was a prosperous decade for American corporations. However, people were not depositing their money
in bank accounts anymore. Bank deposits went up only slightly. Demand deposits rose about 17% from
$8.7 billion in 1921 to $10.5 billion in 1929. 107 Instead the profits were going into stock investments.
Stock prices were meanwhile skyrocketing, rising about 22% in 1925 and about 30% in both 1928 and
1929. 108 This would explain the new emphasis that was placed on making profits in the stock market.
The economy changed as the stock market became part of the everyday discussion. The spread
of investing to all sectors of the public was seen as an important financial development that was
changing domestic and foreign industries. It was also seen as an important social phenomenon, with
some hoping that it would help relieve social tension. 109 The stock market became a national obsession.
In 1929, a magazine report on how Americans had become familiar with stocks noted that a modern
housewife reads about stocks “just as she does that fresh fish is now on the market.” 110 For people who
were wary of investing in the stock market, there was a lot of reason for concern.
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This does not necessarily mean that what was happening in the stock market was all reckless
speculation. Historian Robert Sobel argues, in a 1968 study of the 1920s stock market, that the rise in
the stock market may have been justified since it came along with a huge spurt in economic growth.
The trouble was in the methods used to foster the rise in stocks, such as brokers’ loans and the
participation of large corporations with large amounts of funds; this caused more volatility than there
would otherwise have been. 111 Notwithstanding the economic rationalization, an image of uncontained
gambling was created, and it raised concerns among many observers of the economy. More than the
actual stock market activity, the perception of speculation and gambling among the general public
prompted calls for regulation.
There was a growing sense among observers of American banks that the Federal Reserve Act
had not succeeded in tempering banks’ stock market investments. In 1923, Willis published The
Federal Reserve System: Legislation, Organization and Operation, his second review of the system. He
acknowledged that the system had not worked out as its founders had hoped it would. He observed that
one of the main tenets of the system had failed since the nation apparently did not have enough
commercial paper to allow the Federal Reserve banks to operate as intended. Member banks would
discount with the Federal Reserve the appropriate assets and then keep their other assets for dealings
with other parties. However the Federal Reserve was slow to realize how the banks actually worked. 112
Willis had been aware earlier that banks would have two kinds of assets. But apparently he and the
other drafters of the act had hoped that banks would somehow come to rely more heavily on
commercial paper. It was becoming clear that banks did not need a large proportion of their assets in
commercial paper in order to operate and rediscount adequately with the Federal Reserve.
More importantly, the system had not changed the behavior of banks towards the stock market.
As Willis remarked, “The working of the federal reserve system has apparently not succeeded in
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withdrawing from the stock market the overplus or surplus of funds belonging to banks and previously
employed in stock market speculation.” 113 Despite all intentions, the Federal Reserve had not
succeeded in tempering the speculation. It was especially disappointing that, “in this particular, then,
which before the adoption of the Federal Reserve Act was by many spoken of as a feature of the
financial situation which called most earnestly for correction, the federal reserve system has been
largely without result.” What had been thought of as one of the principal achievements of the act had
turned out not to have been achieved.
Willis seems to have had doubts about what was accomplished with the Federal Reserve plan.
He felt that it had provided security for the nation’s banks. As he saw the system, “it has provided a
bulwark against the recurrent suspensions and ‘panics’ which were in large measure the outgrowth of
the previously existing state of things. It has rendered readily available an emergency remedy which
could be used to correct the immediate results of the evils referred to.” The plan was not completely
successful, since “it has not, as many expected it to do, undermined or eradicated the evils themselves.”
The results were not what had been hoped for. The unhappy upshot was that “altogether. . . the
establishment of the reserve system must be looked upon as having been decidedly disappointing in its
relation to stock speculation.” 114 This may be as close as one can expect someone so involved with
establishing the Federal Reserve System to say that it had failed.
Not everyone was ready to admit that the Federal Reserve had failed at controlling the banks in
this area. In 1927 Glass maintained, as mentioned earlier, that the Federal Reserve Act had cured the
financial system of its “evils” and “cancers.” Willis, who had a more intimate knowledge with bank
operations, recognized by 1923 that not all of the problems had been solved. At the end of the book, he
summarizes his main points and reckons that “outstanding among these conclusions is the fact that the

113
114

Ibid., 1512.
Ibid., 1513-1514.
42

federal reserve system has not accomplished the main objects for which it was intended.” 115 Perhaps
other observers of the Federal Reserve could have, like Willis, noticed that the system would not be
able to contain stock market speculation; it was, however, still regarded as an important goal of the
Federal Reserve.
After 1920, relations between the board and the New York Federal Reserve appear to have
relaxed. But in October 1925 the issue of speculation rose again, with Washington recommending
direct pressure on banks which were loaning for speculative purposes. Governor Strong again refused
to comply and rejected any form of this pressure, saying that denying services to banks carrying
discount loans would mean rationing of credit and would be “disastrous.” 116 He again preferred a
policy of raising discount rates, although he was also not pleased with the effect such an action would
have on the economy. As he wrote on November 7, “It seems a shame that the best sort of plans can be
handicapped by a speculative orgy, and yet the temperament of the people of this country is such that
these situations cannot be avoided.” But he also expressed doubt about the efficacy of the actions in a
November 20th letter, “My feeling has been that having the New York Bank raise its rate first, the bad
news would be out, and, after a severe shock to the stock market, it would go off on its merry way
again.” 117 Strong agreed that the rampant speculation was detrimental to the economy and caused by a
psychological condition that led to the “orgy,” but he was still not convinced that raising interest would
have a real effect on stock market speculation.

Renewed Concern with Speculation
When the stock market did not collapse in catastrophe in 1925, concerns seem to have relaxed
again. Then in late 1927, the Federal Reserve board became increasingly concerned about the stock
market. This time they would not relax until the market had actually crashed. Strong still insisted that
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the Federal Reserve could not get involved in the dealings of the stock market. As he wrote on August
18, 1927 the bank could not continuously worry about speculation since “orgy will always be with us
and if the Federal Reserve System is to be run solely with a view to regulating stock speculation instead
of being devoted to the interests of the industry and commerce of the country, then its policy will
degenerate simply to regulating the affairs of gamblers.” 118 His views had not changed much since
1919, and he still felt that dealing with stock market affairs was not the responsibility of the Federal
Reserve.
The problem that had vexed all those who tried to stop speculation, from the first attempts to
contain speculation in 1908, remained. There was no easy means of determining when a price is
appropriate and when it was bloated due to simple speculation. And since there was no ideal price, the
only thing that could be done was to attempt to lower all prices. But, as Strong explained in September
1927, “an attempt to reduce the prices of stocks cannot be effected without an increase in the cost of
credit employed in carrying stocks.” In other words, all other areas of the economy would be affected,
and it “will be found to have a widespread and somewhat similar effect in other directions, mostly to
the detriment of the healthy prosperity of this country.”119 There was no known way, other than the
admonishment that Glass had hoped for, to regulate just stock prices.
Meanwhile the stock market was continuing to expand. By early 1928, the Federal Reserve
Board was becoming even more concerned about the continued speculation on rising stock prices. In
May 1928, Adolph Miller, the economist on the Board, demanded that executives of the large New
York banks be gathered and warned that they must reduce the speculative activities. 120 Strong, in New
York, was reluctant to perform that sort of action and skeptical that it would make a difference. He
wrote on August 3 that the problem was not really about the prices of stocks or of how much credit was
available. Even if those could somehow be changed, the problem would remain, since “it is really a
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problem of psychology. The country’s state of mind has been highly speculative, advancing prices have
been based upon a realization of the wealth and prosperity of the country, and consequently speculative
tendencies are all the more difficult to deal with.” Having diagnosed the problem as a psychological
one, Strong felt that it was useless to try to do anything about it.
However there was actually now even more reason to doubt that the Federal Reserve could stop
speculation. The stock market had begun to find other sources of money. Increasingly, corporations
began to lend directly to stock brokers. By early 1929, loans for the stock market from corporations and
other non-banking sources were approximately equal to those from banks. 121 Even if the Board’s
directives to stop banks from making these loans had been followed, there were other sources of money
to continue all the activity.
More significantly, perhaps, Strong was not very concerned about the possibility of disaster
resulting from the stock market speculation. He believed that Federal Reserve had the tools necessary
to deal with possible future problems and “that the very existence of the Federal Reserve System is a
safeguard against anything like a calamity growing out of money rates.” If problems did come up, the
Federal Reserve was capable of flooding the market with money and preventing crises. But even more
important was the fact that the Federal Reserve existed. In the past, people had panicked and caused
runs on banks. Now they were aware that the Federal Reserve was able to deal with problems and
would not panic. Therefore, Strong concluded, “mob panic, and consequently mob disaster, is less
likely to arise.” 122 Even the board seems to have been more concerned about the existence of
speculation than about possible negative outcomes. There was clearly no sense of urgency about future
troubles.
Benjamin Strong, as governor of the New York Federal Reserve, was the most influential figure
in the system. On October 16, 1928, Strong died at the age of fifty-five. Strong’s death led to a standoff
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between the New York bank and the Board in Washington. The Board believed that the Federal Reserve
should perform examinations on the banks’ activities and make sure that they were not fueling the
speculation. But the New York bank, sticking to Strong’s position, did not think they could start
meddling in the affairs of the banks and that the best way to stop speculation was to raise the discount
rates, which would make it more expensive to borrow money. Between February 1929 and May 1929,
the directors of the New York Federal Reserve voted eleven times to raise discount rates, and each time
the Board disapproved. 123 Finally in August 1929 the Board approved a rate increase. The need to do
something about the rates does not seem to have been disputed. But quarrels had prevented action from
being taken.
Meanwhile, the stock market continued to rise in 1929, and the Board began meeting almost
daily to discuss how to contain the stock market. In late March 1929, investors began to worry about
what the Board might do. On March 25 and 26, the market started to retreat, reflecting this new worry.
At that point Charles E. Mitchell, the president of the National City Bank, the largest commercial bank,
and a director of the New York Federal Reserve, announced that his bank was prepared to lend out up
to $25 million for the call market. Investors were assured that they would continue to have funds, and
the market started rising again. The Federal Reserve Board was learning that actually stopping the
stock market was not easily accomplished.
The Board was furious at having been thwarted by the banks, especially by someone who was a
director of one of the Federal Reserve banks. Senator Glass charged that Mitchell was “guilty of
slapping the Federal Reserve Board ‘squarely in the face.’” Glass called for Mitchell’s resignation from
the Federal Reserve. 124 But there were no more major attempts to deal with the stock market. This
effectively ended the Board’s efforts at regulating the market in 1929.
This state continued until the whole financial system was disrupted. Tuesday, October 29, 1929

123
124

Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, 254-259.
Ibid., 260-261. Galbraith, The Great Crash, 35-39.
46

is considered to be the day on which the stock market crashed. Although the market had already been
declining since early September, there seemed to have been hope among investors that the market
would rebound. But on October 29, the optimism appears to have vanished. One widely used index
dropped so much on that day that it closed lower than it had a year earlier and erased all of the gains of
the previous year. 125 The stock market could not sustain the level of optimism that the public
expressed.
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4. Failures and Passage of the Act

Crash and Regulation Attempts
However, a stock market crash does not have to have a catastrophic impact on the entire
economy. In fact, as historian Robert Sobel notes, “no causal relationship between the events of late
October 1929 and the Great Depression has ever been shown through the use of empirical evidence.” 126
Economist Christina Romer, who argued that there was a partial link between the crash and the Great
Depression, explains that the crash was connected to the subsequent depression since it caused
consumers to lose confidence in future income. However, the loss in value of assets effected by the
crash was a distinct event and did not directly lead to the depression. 127 That is not what would be
assumed considering all the concerns of the Federal Reserve Board leading up to the stock crash and
the allegations made afterwards. However, there was no particular weakening of banks or failures in
1929. People did not panic and run to claim their deposits, and the money stock stayed relatively
steady. 128 The economy at that time went into a recession, which is when the money stock began to
decline, not after the crash. 129 It was not until October 1930, a full year after the crash, that a wave of
banks failed. Another wave of failures took place in mid-1931. The banks appeared to have stabilized,
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until January 1933 when the largest wave of bank failures occurred. 130 As the failures continued, a
movement began to make changes to the banking system, although there was little consensus that the
problem lay in the system. There seems not to have been widespread support for drastic changes at the
time. Apparently it was not that obvious that the problem had been caused by the banks.
However, to people such as Glass, who had always been nervous about the stock market and
speculation, the indication was clear that speculation had caused all the trouble. In early 1931, right
after the first wave of bank failures, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee set up a
subcommittee to investigate the “operation of the national and federal banking systems,” with Senator
Carter Glass as its chairman. The subcommittee was pursuant to Senate resolution 71, “to provide for a
more effective operation of the national and Federal reserve banking systems of the country.” The
conclusion that the problem lay in the operation of the system seems to have been accepted before the
hearings began. Its goals were even more specific. The resolution called for an inquiry into the
“banking systems with respect to the use of their facilities for trading in and carrying speculative
securities” and the effect it had on the system.
There was also another topic they would examine, which seemed minor at the time but ended up
derailing the entire plan. The inquiry was to look into the advantages of branch banking. The American
banking system had generally not allowed banks to set up branches. This was to prevent banks from
growing too large. But that was also thought to be one of the reasons that U.S. banks failed so often. 131
If the large banks could set up branches in rural areas, those banks would be better funded than the
small, independent banks that were prone to failures. The discussion of branch banking ended up
covering most of the hearings, with relatively little time devoted to studying what had caused bank
failures.
That bank speculation had led to failures seems to have already been determined by the second
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day, although it was just the first of several rounds of hearings into bank operations. On January 20, the
second day of the hearings, the subcommittee heard testimony from George L. Harrison, the successor
to Strong as the governor of the New York Federal Reserve. The dialogue between Glass and Harrison
must be seen in the context of their relationship the previous several years. Glass, a member of the
Federal Reserve Board, had been a proponent of paying closer attention to the activities of the banks
and not allowing them to make loans that would be used for the stock market. This approach was
opposed by Harrison and the New York Federal Reserve. It was a contentious issue and was brought up
many times during the hearings.
This was perhaps the first time that the positions of the Board and the New York Bank were
discussed publicly, and the antagonism was apparent. The committee asked Harrison why the banks
had not been prevented from loaning for the stock market. Harrison explained that banks do not come
to the Federal Reserve asking for money that they will use for a specific purpose. Banks have many
divisions working concurrently on unrelated operations. They do not know how much they will need to
get from their reserves until they tally all the various activities. If they see that there is a need for
money, they proceed to the Federal Reserve. Indeed, if the Federal Reserve would ask the banks what
they would do with the money, “the bank would probably say to us, ‘We do not know; we are just
filling up the void that has occurred as the result of the total of our day’s transactions.” 132 The officers
of the banks would not be able to say that the money is for a particular operation, since they review all
of their divisions in aggregate.
Glass felt that the loans could have been supervised and was clearly upset about this. He pressed
Harrison, insisting that the sole purpose of the Federal Reserve had been to enable commerce and
business to operate. And since the Federal Reserve Act had specified that only paper related to actual
business could be discounted, there should have been no other activities at the banks. To this Harrison
pointed out that the act had said nothing about what the banks were doing. It merely stipulated what
132
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kind of paper could be used at the Federal Reserve. In other words, the act was concerned with the
integrity of the assets at the Federal Reserve. There was no mention of how member banks were to
operate and what they were allowed to do with loans.
This was not how Glass had understood the act. He continued questioning Harrison: “you think
then that this law is practically futile and a dead letter? In other words, you think that a member bank
that wants to engage in the business of making loans for the purchase and carrying of stocks on the
market has a right to do so?” 133 Harrison explained that even before the recent wild speculation on the
stock market, it had been an important activity of the banks to provide loans for stock purchases. If
Congress had intended to eliminate such an important aspect of the banks, explicit mention should have
been made of this. Since the act did not say anything about bank activities, that could not have been a
great concern at the time.
However, this understanding of the Federal Reserve Act contradicted the understanding of its
main sponsor and advocate, Senator Glass. And he persisted with his view at the hearings, “I want to
adduce your opinion as to the intent of that prohibition of the law there. What had the proponents of the
Federal reserve system in mind when they inserted that prohibition in the law?. . . Was not the intent
clearly to prohibit the use of Federal reserve banking facilities for that purpose?” 134 Harrison seemed to
be truly confused by this, because, as he said, there was no indication in the act that the purpose had
been to stop bank loans for the stock market. And if that was the intent, the methods for enforcing such
a policy were not included in the act. He stated, “I do not think it was intended to control or even
prohibit speculation upon the part of the American people.” Rather, the limiting of permissible assets
was meant to strengthen the holdings of the Federal Reserve. But that would not prevent the banks
from providing money for stock market purchases. 135
The committee did not accept these arguments and submitted its report to the Senate on April
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22, 1932. It advised that the reforms should be passed immediately, because they “include[d] the
correction of evils which reached a peak of danger in 1929 and abuses which have gradually grown up
within the banking system itself.” 136 A great inflation of bank credit had taken place after 1925 which
was not related to an enlargement of demand by businesses. Instead, the report said, “it is now evident
that the increase in deposit credit” went to other purposes, including “the carrying and inflating of the
prices of securities, especially common stocks.” 137
According to the report, there had been too much money available to the banks. Because of
surplus reserves and gold imports, banks had more than was necessary for lending to commercial
activities. In large part these extra funds were created due to securities issued by businesses. The public
which purchased these securities had to get the funds from somewhere, and this “was unquestionably
obtained from the banks.” These funds obtained by the businesses then “went into the stock market and
fostered excessive speculation.” 138
This mention of extra funds at the banks was meant to explain what had fueled the stock
speculation of the recent years. As the report pointed out, however, in addition to enabling unnecessary
speculation the banks themselves suffered from it. They had been invested in securities, which mature
over a long period, rather than staying with commercial paper, which matures in a shorter term. As a
result, “a very fruitful cause of bank failures, especially within the past two years, has been the fact that
the funds of the various institutions have been so extensively ‘tied up’ in long-term investments.” This
undermined the purpose of the banks, since “national banks were never intended to undertake
investment banking business on a large scale.” 139 Not only had banks caused the speculation, but they
had also ruined their own operations and were no longer able to fulfill their obligations.
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Defeat and Renewal
The committee proposed several regulations to rectify the problems. The main suggestion was
to separate banks as far as possible from securities and the stock market. The examination powers of
the Federal Reserve were to be expanded. It now would have the authority to supervise all relations and
transactions of member banks. There would also be changes to laws on bank branches, which would
allow banks to establish branches in the home state and sometimes also in a neighboring state. The
regulations would thus limit the scope of bank operations, while at the same allowing for expansion of
permitted operations.
The provision allowing banks to establish branches proved to be the most controversial aspect
of the Act. Senator Peter Norbeck of South Dakota, chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency
committee, submitted a dissenting report. The dissenting senators were particularly upset about the
potential effects of allowing branch banking. The report stated that “the unit banker has had a most
prominent place in the development of the United States… It has been through his foresight, strength of
character, and belief in these great United States of ours that our country has become the foremost in
commerce and industry.” Allowing banks to grow large and centralized would have dismal results,
because “the history of our country might have been different if our banking system had been
controlled from Washington or New York.” 140 This idealized description of bankers imparted a message
that tampering with them would risk losing all that was valuable to the nation.
Branch banking, it was argued, would lead to only more problems in the system. The idea was
“part of the preconceived plan for…placing the control of our banking structure in financial centers.”
This would place responsibility for the banks in the hands of those who might disregard the interests of
the people, since “when banking and credit are centralized in a few hands, it is easier for the powerful
to get control of such corporations.” 141 These were actually the same arguments that had been used by
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Andrew Jackson and throughout the nineteenth century in opposition to a central bank. Some people
felt that the structure of the Federal Reserve System had avoided the main problems, but with branch
banking those fears would be realized.
The bill submitted by Glass and co-sponsored by Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama
was not admired by all of Congress. It came up several times in the first half of 1932, each time failing
to receive enough votes to pass, until the Senate decided to remove it from the calendar in June. 142
Instead a minor banking act, also co-sponsored by Glass and Steagall, was passed on February 27,
1932, providing more methods for troubled banks to receive funds. The main issues of contention with
the bill were the provisions on branch banking. But some were also skeptical of Glass’ ambition to
rectify the system. Norbeck wrote that Glass “seems determined to work out a ‘perfect banking system’
before he leaves the stage. He may know what that means, but I am sure that neither you nor I do.” 143
Aside from the opposition to bank branches, the measure to separate commercial banks from
investment activity did not seem to be very significant to the senators. If it was seen as vital to reducing
bank failures, there would presumably have been discussion and focus on those measures.
However, the bill was not yet dead. In the election of 1932, Roosevelt and the Democratic Party
campaigned against Wall Street and financial interests. And the bill again came up for debate on
January 5, 1933, with Glass attempting to impress on his fellow senators the urgency of its passage. He
argued that small banks were “choked with immobile, and in many cases, worthless securities.” The
banks had refused to write off their losses, and were likely to fail if the bill was not accepted. 144 But
many senators were still unhappy about the provision allowing bank branches.
The bill was eventually defeated due to that opposition. Senator Huey Long of Louisiana was
particularly instrumental in its defeat. On January 10, he began a filibuster of the bill, reading from two
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bibles and claiming that “the Lord himself” opposed branch banking. 145 The Senate failed to override
the filibuster, and the Glass-Steagall bill was again removed on January 25. Presenting traditional
banking as a divine institution seems to have deterred the Senate from acting. It is hardly likely that
such an argument would have been effective if the legislation in question was understood to be vital to
the nation. Clearly, the separation of commercial banks from securities was still not seen as an urgent
matter. 146
Capitalizing on the resistance towards Wall Street, in January 1933 Norbeck established a
committee to investigate the practices of banks, especially regarding stock operations. The
investigations, headed by Ferdinand Pecora, a lawyer who had been called the “most brilliant crossexaminer in New York,” 147 began in February. The Pecora Commission, which became famous for its
exposure of the abuses and crimes of prominent Wall Street figures, lasted into 1934. But the most
significant damage to the image of banks was done during the first few days of the hearings, at the end
of February 1933.
Those first few days left the public with a picture of financial institutions as criminal and
decadent. Charles Mitchell, chairman of National City Bank, was one of the first to testify. Under
Pecora’s questioning, it emerged that Mitchell had evaded taxes, and his bank had sold stocks that
Mitchell regretted. 148 Over the next few days, Pecora managed to expose various other unseemly
behaviors by bank directors. By the end of the week, Mitchell, who had once been one of the most
prominent figures in the financial community, had resigned. 149 Public opinion was disgusted with the
banks, with one newspaper saying that it was a “group that whooped up the stock market boom,
diverted credit from legitimate business, exercised a controlling hand at Washington, and took the
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American people for the greatest buggy ride in their history during the last decade.” 150 Any confidence
that people may have had in banks was shattered, particularly regarding their stock market operations.
In this environment, there seemed to be a greater chance of the Glass-Steagall Act being passed.
On March 9, 1933, Glass reintroduced the bill. This time, even some of the bankers supported the bill,
hoping to clear their reputations. One banker announced that “the spirit of speculation should be
eradicated from the management of commercial banks.” 151 There was no filibuster this time, and the
bill was approved on June 16, 1933. It became part of the array of resolutions passed in Roosevelt’s
first hundred days.
As mentioned earlier, there was very little evidence supporting the need for the act. On the
contrary, studies have shown that banks with securities affiliates—the activities of which were
commonly referred to as speculation—were actually safer. But the abuses and excesses were also real
and politically very damaging. It became easy to rally people to oppose the activities of banks,
especially when they were framed as speculation and gambling.
There was much effort expended on examining the claims of the committees and banks, to see
what the basis for the act was. And many people looked, and continue to look, to the events of 1929 to
explain what had inspired the act, as mentioned earlier. But the act was actually based on conceptions
that dated much earlier than 1929. Those same ideas had in fact been part of the impetus that spurred
the creation of the Federal Reserve System, as seen in several of the references cited above. For the
people who shared those ideas, namely Glass and his advisors, there was no need to look at the record
of the 1920s to decide what action should be taken. It was already known that any actions necessary to
prevent what they felt was speculation should be taken. The stock market crash and subsequent bank
failures served only to validate what they already took for granted.
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Impact of Glass-Steagall
What kind of effect, if any, did the regulations of Glass-Steagall have on bank operations? The
act included provisions that led to the formation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which
insures commercial deposits and may have had a significant impact in reducing bank failures. 152
However, the most well-known provision of the act attempted to change how banks operated; the intent
was to change the lending from activities that were seen as speculative to lending that was closely
related to commercial activity. An important question when examining any sort of regulation is whether
it had the intended effect.
The main objective, which was to have solved many of the problems, was to reduce speculation,
and it would be most beneficial to measure whether speculation was changed. Unfortunately, in this
context there is no way to really measure speculation. As mentioned earlier, Glass never gave a clear
definition of what activities were considered speculation and, thus, were intended to be eliminated.
Therefore it is not clear how one would gauge whether there was more or less speculation.
The other goal of the bill, which had also been a goal of the Federal Reserve Act, was to
integrate banks more with the commercial needs of the country. The intent was that when companies
needed funds for industrial or commercial activities, they should be able to borrow from banks.
Therefore, there was anxiety about the amount of bank funds that were used to finance stock market
purchases rather than “real” commercial activity.
Changes in how banks allocated funds are something which can perhaps be measured. As
demonstrated in Table 1, the percentage of loans that were used for securities diminished in the years
following the Glass-Steagall Act, which would seem to indicate that the act had been successful in
reducing securities-related loans. The trouble with this comparison is that not all that went under the
rubric “securities” was prohibited by Glass-Steagall. A large portion was related to operations of
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Table 1.
Loans for Securities 1928-1938
(in millions of dollars)
Total Loans
Loans on
securities
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

Percentage of
total loans

24,325
8,545
25,658
9,759
25,214
10,425
21,816
8,334
16,587
5,570
12,858
4,704
12,523
4,598
11,928
4,098
12,542
4,209
14,285
4,365
12,938
3,316
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Banking and
Monetary Statistics 1914-1941, 76, 79.

35.1%
38.0%
41.3%
38.2%
33.6%
36.6%
36.7%
34.4%
33.6%
30.6%
25.6%

businesses, both commercial and agricultural. This can be observed by looking at later figures. After
1938, banks began reporting the figures differently, splitting the securities into different categories. 153
Some of the loans, related to commerce and agriculture, would not have been affected by GlassSteagall. 154 Therefore, the reduction in securities may have been from those areas that were not affected
by the act. Nevertheless, although it is difficult to rely on these figures for accurate changes caused by
the bill, a general trend of diminished involvement in securities can be seen.
Another aspect to look at is what kind of assets banks held instead of securities. If it could be
shown what proportion of bank loans went to commercial activities and what proportion went to stock
brokers, it would perhaps be possible to measure how banks changed. The trouble is that before 1940
banks did not distinguish which among their loans were for the purpose of stock market purchases,
except under the general securities category.
This may not be a major concern since securities activities were greatly reduced throughout the
Great Depression and Second World War. The period that would best reflect changes in bank operations
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Table 2.
Loans by class
(in thousands of dollars)
Total loans
Commercial
Percentage Total loans for
Percentage
and
loans*
of
Securities
of
discounts
Total
Total
1939
9,043,632
4,395,392
48.6%
729,329
8.1%
1941
11,751,792
6,398,829
54.4%
590,169
5.0%
1943
10,133,532
5,604,814
55.3%
949,453
9.4%
1945
13,948,042
6,388,969
45.8%
3,418,499
24.5%
1947
21,480,457
11,892,157
55.4%
998,015
4.6%
1949
23,928,293
11,955,199
50.0%
1,184,564
5.0%
1951
32,423,777
17,673,425
54.5%
1,206,126
3.7%
1953
37,944,146
18,971,297
50.0%
1,658,765
4.4%
1955
43,559,726
20,417,583
46.9%
1,840,602
4.2%
1957
50,502,277
24,117,863
47.8%
1,800,744
3.6%
1959
59,961,989
24,740,446
41.3%
1,951,249
3.3%
*Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural (including open market)
Source: Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1940-1959

Consumer
loans
n/a
n/a
n/a
1,096,453
3,128,783
4,452,842
5,802,445
8,123,980
9,409,571
11,227,130
13,469,652

Percentag
e of
Total
n/a
n/a
n/a
7.9%
14.6%
18.6%
17.9%
21.4%
21.6%
22.2%
22.5%

would be the later 1940s and early 1950s. As these figures show (table 2), there were changes in bank
loans, with a much smaller proportion of loans going towards securities-related lending. This could be
interpreted as a success of Glass-Stegall.
However, the proportionate reduction of loans for securities did not reflect a simultaneous rise
in loans for commerce. In fact, commercial and agricultural loans also diminished over the period in
Table 2. Instead, a new type of loan, called consumer, or expenditure loans, emerged. These might not
be considered speculative loans, in the context discussed here, since they were not related to the stock
market. But they were also not loans that were backed by any sort of paper relating to a real business
transaction. It seems, therefore, that as loans for securities diminished, a new kind of loan emerged that
was no more closely linked to commercial activity than securities were. A simple test comparing the
decline in securities loans to the rise in consumer loans (over the entire period, not just the years in
Table 2) shows a correlation of -0.81261, indicating that there might be a relation between the decline
of one and the rise of the other.
An observation might therefore be made that a restriction on transactions that banks are allowed
to perform will not necessarily redirect the funds towards transactions that might be preferred. It is
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reasonable to assume that a new venue for banks to invest in will later emerge that is not specifically
prohibited but also not the type of investment that was intended. That appears to be what occurred in
the aftermath of the Glass-Steagall Act.

Conclusions
This paper has examined the ideas and attitudes that led to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act
in 1933. The provisions separating commercial and investment banking may seem to have little
relevance to banking and legislation after the act was repealed in 1999. However, as mentioned earlier,
in 2008 there were calls to revive the act, based on the understanding that Glass-Steagall was
formulated drawing on analysis into conditions and failures of banks and, in fact, prevented a
recurrence of those failures.
In this paper it was argued that the rationale was not actually based on bank operations and
conditions. Rather, the act was passed due to a combination of ideological and moral positions
predetermined to any problems. The success of the act is also questionable, since the banking trends in
the decades immediately following the act do not seem to have achieved what was expected. From this
it might be decided that reviving Glass-Steagall will not be effective.
However, it is possible, while not likely, that contrary to what occurred when the act was
passed, this time it is really warranted and will somehow succeed in tempering the “speculative devils.”
Conditions may have changed, such that banks’ involvement in securities will actually cause harm and
perhaps failures. The types of securities traded today are much more complex and prone to
miscalculation than securities traded in the 1920s. Furthermore, one could argue that the effort to
regulate is worthwhile on its own. Regulation should be based on current circumstances and logical
solutions. What happened decades ago, it could be said, should not dictate how banks are regulated
today.
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Perhaps there is a more profound lesson that can be learned from Glass-Steagall. The effects of
regulations cannot always be anticipated. What seems to be logical and justified at the time of crisis
may later prove to be entirely different. The results may be not realized as hoped for, and the motives
may not be what they were thought to be. Major changes passed during a crisis will often have
unpredicted outcomes. While there is no alternative to empirical analysis of situations and causes, when
regulations do not change conditions as expected, it might be best to return and reevaluate the original
rationale and evidence for the regulations. The circumstances often look quite different after a longer
period and with different methods of analysis.
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